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In 1987 the federal government permitted states to raise the speed limit on their rural interstate 
roads, but not on their urban interstate roads, from 55 mph to 65 mph for the first time in over a 
decade.  Since the states that adopted the higher speed limit must have valued the travel hours 
they saved more than the fatalities incurred, this experiment provides a way to estimate an upper 
bound on the public’s willingness to trade off wealth for a change in the probability of death.  
We find that the 65 mph limit increased speeds by approximately 3.5% (i.e., 2 mph), and 
increased fatality rates by roughly 35%.  In the 21 states that raised the speed limit and for whom 
we have complete data, the estimates suggest that about 125,000 hours were saved per lost life.  
Valuing the time saved at the average hourly wage implies that adopting states were willing to 
accept risks that resulted in a savings of $1.54 million (1997$) per fatality, with a sampling error 
that might be around one-third this value.  Since this estimate is an upper bound of the value of a 
statistical life (VSL), we set out a simple structural model that is identified by variability across 
the states in the probability of the adoption of increased speed limits to recover the VSL.  The 
empirical implementation of this model produces estimates of the VSL that are generally smaller 
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   Public choices about safety in a democratic society require estimates of the willingness of 
people to trade off wealth for a reduction in the probability of death.  In this paper we exploit a 
novel opportunity to measure the revealed preferences for safety risks from public choices about 
speed limits.  The idea is to measure the value of the time saved per incremental fatality that 
results from the voluntary adoption of an increased speed limit.  Since adopters must have valued 
the time saved by greater speeds more than the fatalities created, this ratio provides a convincing 
and credible upper bound on the value of a statistical life (VSL). 
  Although there have been a number of creative attempts designed to estimate the value of 
a statistical life,
1 there have been few opportunities to obtain estimates based on the public’s 
willingness to accept an exogenous and known safety risk.  Our analysis exploits the opportunity 
that the federal government gave the states in 1987 to choose a speed limit for rural interstate 
highways that was higher than the uniform national maximum speed limit then in existence.  
This remarkable experiment led 40 of the 47 states that have rural interstate highways to adopt 
65 mile per hour (mph) speed limits on them, while the remaining 7 states retained 55 mph speed 
limits.    
  This institutional change permits us to address several conceptual problems that have 
plagued previous attempts to estimate the value of a statistical life.  First, the earliest estimates of 
the value of a statistical life were based on hedonic wage equations that many observers 
acknowledge suffer from severe omitted variables biases.
2  The 1987 change in speed limits 
provides an exogenous change that avoids the difficulties inherent in making causal inferences 
with observational data on individuals’ past optimizing decisions.  Moreover, our estimates of 
the tradeoffs between the value of time saved and fatalities can be made both from comparisons 
of rural interstate highways across states that altered their speed limits with those that did not and 
from comparisons of rural interstates and other highways within states that adopted increased 
speeds.  This statistical design provides many alternative estimates of the actual tradeoff between 
                                                 
1 For useful, detailed surveys see Viscusi (1993) and Blomquist (2001).  Also see de Blaeij, et al. 
(2000) for a formal meta-analysis of the value of a statistical life from studies of road safety. 
2 See especially Hersch (1998), who documents that for male blue collar workers injury risks are 
usually estimated as negatively related to wage rates, implying VSL estimates that are also 
negative.  This finding is universally interpreted to result from the difficulty in properly 
specifying and measuring the key variables that enter wage equations. the value of travel time and fatalities and thus provides many tests of the consistency of the 
estimates.   
  Second, many questions have been raised about the usefulness of studies of the value of a 
statistical life when the decision makers studied may be poorly informed about the relevant risks.  
We show that the relevant decision makers (i.e., state governments) were cognizant of the trade-
offs associated with a change in speed limits.  Although this does not provide conclusive 
evidence that the participants in the decisions were well informed, it is certainly more plausible 
than is often the case. 
Third, any VSL estimate that is based on the decisions of a third party (e.g., government 
policies) may not reflect the preferences of the group whose VSL is of interest.  For example, 
federal regulatory agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Federal Aviation 
Administration, regularly assess prospective safety projects.  Since the benefits and costs of these 
regulations are borne by entirely different groups, the agency’s decisions may be seriously 
distorted by the inevitable political process by which they are determined.  It seems likely that 
the substantial heterogeneity both across and within the cost per life saved in enacted safety 
projects shown by Viscusi (2000) reflects these problems.  Speed limit regulations, however, 
provide benefits (reduced travel time) and costs (fatality risk) to precisely the same people, so 
that appeals to a simple model of the typical voter are far more plausible in this context. 
Finally, in studies of safety risks in the market place it is inevitably the VSL of a selected 
group of individuals that place a low valuation on increased risks that is measured, since they 
will be the marginal adopters.  These individuals’ VSL will rarely be the appropriate one for 
evaluating policies that affect a broader cross-section of the population.  In contrast, this paper 
presents a simple individual-level behavioral model that predicts that the median voter’s/driver’s 
preferences determine which states adopt the higher limit.  We provide evidence that is 
consistent with this behavioral interpretation of the results.  
  Our empirical results indicate that among states that adopted increased speed limits on 
their rural interstates, average speeds increased by approximately 3.5% (i.e., 2 mph) while 
fatality rates increased by roughly 35%.  In the 21 states that raised the speed limit and for whom 
we have complete data, the estimates suggest that there were an additional 45 million hours 
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 saved and 360 lives lost annually, which translate into 125,000 hours per life.  These two effects 
are estimated reasonably precisely and the key inferences are similar across many different 
specifications. 
Valuing the time saved from increased speeds at the average hourly wage implies that 
adopting states were willing to accept risks that resulted in a saving of $1.54 million (1997$) per 
fatality. Since this figure is the value of time saved per marginal fatality among states adopting 
higher speed limits, it provides an upper bound on the VSL in the adopting states.  We set out a 
simple structural model that is identified by variability across the states in the probability of the 
adoption of increased speed limits to recover the VSL.  The empirical implementation of this 
model produces estimates of the VSL that are generally smaller than $1.54 million, but these 
estimates are very imprecise.   
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section I sets out the conceptual rationale for a 
simple econometric model that may be used to estimate the tradeoff between risk and wealth.  
Section II provides a brief history of speed limits and describes how the 1987 law can be used to 
estimate the VSL.  Section III describes the data sources, presents the key descriptive statistics, 
and reports the unadjusted estimates of the effects of the 65 mph speed limit on fatalities and 
speeds.  Section IV lays out the econometric framework for a structural model of safety 
decisions.  Section V presents our estimates of the value of time saved per marginal fatality, 
while Section VI reports on our efforts to obtain an estimate of the value of a statistical life.  
Finally, a discussion of the primary results and some of their major limitations in Section VII is 
followed by a brief conclusion. 
I.  Conceptual Framework 
In order to see how empirical estimates of the effect of speed limits on speeds and 
fatalities provide a way to quantify the revealed preferences of the median driver/voter for safety, 
it is useful to set up a simple explicit model of behavior 
A. Selecting an Optimal Speed 
  The first order effect of traveling at a higher speed is a change in travel times for each 
mile traveled by each driver and a corresponding change in the likelihood of a fatality.  This 
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 ignores the altered costs of fuel and other driving costs from altered speeds.  These incremental 
costs, as noted by Ghosh, Lees, and Seal (1975), are very small compared to the time costs.   
To provide a dollar measure of the value of life, it is necessary to provide a dollar value 
to the benefits of travel.  To do this write h for the hours spent traveling m miles so that (h/m) = 
(1/s) is the average hours required to travel m miles per driver.  (h/m) is, of course, the reciprocal 
of the average speed (s) on the road.  If the cost of an hour of time spent traveling is w, then the 
average cost of a mile of travel time per driver is 
(1)     c = w(h/m). 
c is also a measure of the value of a mile spent traveling.  After all, if a mile of travel were not 
worth at least c, it would not be undertaken. 
  The appropriate way to measure the cost of time can be controversial.  For most workers, 
however, a natural measure of the value (or cost) of their time is their wage rate.  In the empirical 
work reported below, we use the mean wage rate in adopting states as a measure of the value of 
time, but our primary measurement methods do not depend on this assumption and other values 
may be used where appropriate.  For some cases, it may be thought that a value less than the 
wage rate is appropriate.
3  Virtually any measure of the cost of a worker’s time, however, will be 
closely linked to a worker’s wage. 
  Selecting a speed balances the desire to reduce the cost (c) of travel time by increasing 
speed (s) against the risks of increased fatalities that may exist from greater speeds. The full 
costs of travel are then 
(2)     g = g(c, f(c/w)), 
where g1 > 0, g2 > 0, and f = (F/m) is fatalities (F) per mile and the function f(c/w) = f(h/m) = 
f(1/s), with f ’ < 0, indicates how fatalities increase with speeds.
4 
                                                 
3 See Beesley (1965), Lee and Dalvi (1971), Domencich and McFadden (1975), Deacon and 
Sonstelie (1985), and Waters (1996). 
4 This model is based on the assumption that vehicle miles traveled are fixed and independent of 
speed limits.  It is a straightforward matter to extend the model to include the value of miles 
traveled as a separate component of welfare.  Moreover, the evidence available is consistent with 
this approach.  Greenstone (2002) uses data from 1982-90 and finds that vehicle miles of travel 
on rural interstates did not increase in states that adopted the 65 mph speed limit.  We extended 
this analysis to the length of our sample (1982-93) and reach a similar conclusion (the results are 
available upon request).   
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 The effect of a decrease in travel time on the total costs of travel time per mile is 
(3)     dg/d(h/m) = g1w + g2f ’. 
At low levels of speed, increases in speed presumably reduce time costs (g1w) by more than the 
increased accident costs (g2f ’).  Thus, a small increase in speed, ds, that leads to a decrease in 
travel time of dh and an increase in fatalities of df is desirable if - g1wdh > g2df, which is 
satisfied when 
(4)     -w(dh/df) >  (g2/g1). 
The speed that minimizes the full time and accident costs of travel, if it exists, satisfies 
(5)     V ≡ -w/f ’ = (g2/g1) ≡ V*. 
When (5) is satisfied, the monetary value of the extra time saved per marginal fatality, V ≡ w/f ’, 
is just equal to the rate of substitution between monetary travel costs and fatalities, V* ≡ (g2/g1). 
  The rate of substitution between monetary travel time costs and fatalities, V* ≡ (g2/g1), is 
often called the value of a statistical life.
5  This interpretation is derived from the fact that 
increases in speeds that decrease the cost of travel time per incremental fatality by more (less) 
than V* will decrease (increase) the full costs of travel.  A driver who minimizes the full cost of 
travel would correspondingly increase (or decrease) speeds according to whether the monetary 
value of time saved per fatality were greater or less than (g2/g1), the implied monetary value of a 
life. 
B. Optimal Speed Limits 
The above discussion shows how an individual driver should determine his or her optimal speed, 
but it provides no rationale for the existence of speed limits.  In fact, legally enforced speed 
limits are a result of the externality present because the probability of a fatality depends not only 
on a driver’s own decision about the speed of travel, but also on the decisions of other drivers.  
The setting of a speed limit is, therefore, a political decision and this is widely recognized by 
traffic safety regulators.  For example, an Indiana Department of Transportation report on speed 
limits concludes that: 
“Speed limits represent trade-offs between risk and travel time for a road 
class or specific highway section reflecting an appropriate balance 
between the societal [emphasis added] goals of safety and mobility.  The 
                                                 
5 See especially Thaler and Rosen (1976) and Viscusi (1993). 
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 process of setting speed limits is not merely a technical exercise.  It 
involves value judgments and trade-offs that are in the arena of the 
political process” (Khan, Sinha, and McCarthy, 2000, p. 144). 
It follows that the appropriate specification of equation (2) for individual i will depend on 
the speed limit (L) through its effect on the i
th driver’s speed, but also on the risk of a fatality 
resulting from other drivers’ responses to L.  This is denoted as 




i ((c/w)(L)),  
where c
i(L) indicates the effect of the speed limit on the i
th driver’s average cost of a mile 
traveled and f 
i ((c/w)(L)) shows how the i
th driver’s probability of a fatality depends on the 
speed limit L (through the vector of speeds (c/w)(L)).  From the point of view of the i
th driver, 
the optimal speed limit balances the decreased cost of a mile traveled against his or her increased 
fatality risk, which is satisfied when 







 1) ≡ V*
i. 
  The key implication of this analysis of the social decision about speed limits is that the 
observed result reflects the value of a statistical life for the person whose views are reflected in 
the political process.  Black (1948) shows that in the absence of non-political frictions, the 
driver/voter whose interests are reflected in the social decision is likely to be positioned in the 
center of the distribution of preferences for safety, as no other decision will be more politically 
acceptable.
6  Consequently, this model indicates that our empirical analysis should be interpreted 
as an analysis of the preferences of the median, or politically representative driver/voter. 
 
C. The Value of a Statistical Life and Mandatory Speed Limits 
  A key point of the previous discussion is that measures of the monetary value of time 
saved per fatality as a result of a speed increase do not provide a measure of the value of a 
statistical life, V*.  In general, such measures provide only a bound to the value of a statistical 
life. 
Suppose, for example, the median driver/voter is offered the opportunity to increase the 
speed limit from S to S’ through the political process.  Associated with this offer is a decrease 
                                                 
6 Black (1948) shows that if choices are unidimensional and preferences are single-peaked, the 
median voter’s preferences will determine the social decision.  
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 in the cost of travel time of w∆hi, in location i, and an increase in fatalities of ∆fi, so that we may 
write 
(6)   Vi = -w(∆hi/∆fi) 
           = α + βZi + εi, 
where Zi and εi index observable and unobservable factors that make the effects of a speed limit 
increase more or less costly per fatality.  The left hand side of equation (6) is a discrete measure 
of V in equation (5). 
  We assume the value of a statistical life, V* in equation (5), for the median voter/driver 
in state i can be approximated by 
(7)      Vi* = α’ + β’Xi + εi’, 
where Xi and εi’ index observable and unobservable factors that influence the value of a 
statistical life.  From the inequality (4), it follows that a higher speed limit will be adopted if Vi > 
Vi*, for in this case the time costs saved by the higher speeds that result from the higher speed 
limit will be greater per fatality than the value of the median statistical life, Vi*.  The probability 
that the higher speed limit is adopted is thus: 
  (8)    Pr (Adoption) = Pr (Vi > Vi*)   
     =   P r   ( εi - εi’ < α - α’ + βZi - β’Xi). 
  It is apparent that the average value of V amongst adopters, E(V|Adoption) = 
E(V|V>V*), must be at least as great as E(V*), the unconditional average value of a statistical 
life among both adopters and non-adopters.  Thus, the measured average value of time costs 
saved per fatality from the adoption of an increased speed limit is generally greater than the 
mean value of a statistical life and provides an upper bound on that quantity.  More generally, 
because the left hand side of equation (6) is only observed for adopters, estimation of the 
parameters of equation (6) may suffer from selection bias. 
  To make further progress in estimation, we assume that εi and εi’ are joint normally 
distributed, so that (8) can be estimated by the probit function: 
 (9)     Pr  (Adoption)  =  F[(α - α’ + βZi - β’Xi)/σ], 
where σ = σε - ε’ is (var (ε - ε’))
1/2 and F[•] is the cumulative unit normal distribution.  It is 
apparent that even with this functional form assumption, it is only possible to obtain estimates of 
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 (α - α’)/ σ, β/σ, β’/σ; the separate parameters in equations (6) and (7) cannot be identified from 
this probit function alone. 
  However, since Vi is observable, it is possible to estimate (6) by the usual selection 
corrected regression methods (Heckman 1979).  In particular, 
 (10)   E(Vi|adoption) = α + βZi + ρσελi, 
where ρ is the correlation between ε and ε’, λi = λ(Xi, Zi) = f(µ’Wi)/F(µ’Wi), and µ’ consists of 
the vector [α - α’, β, -β’]’ and Wi the vector [1, Xi, Zi].  It is apparent that from estimates of (9) 
and (10) it is possible to obtain estimates of α’ and β’.  These parameters can then be used to 
derive an estimate of V*, the mean value of a statistical life from (7).  
II.  Speed Limit Legislation and a New Approach to Estimating the VSL 
 
A.  A Brief History of Speed Limits 
The first laws imposing restrictive speed limits on motor vehicles were passed in 1901 in 
Connecticut.  With the exception of a Second World War emergency limit of 35 mph, the setting 
of speed limits remained the responsibility of the state and local governments until 1974.  In that 
year Congress enacted the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act in response to the 
perceived “energy crisis.”  This bill, intended as a fuel conservation measure, required, among 
other things, a national maximum speed limit of 55 mph.  This new national speed limit was 
lower than the existing maximum daytime speed limit in all 50 states. 
By 1976 the Federal Highway Administration began to enforce compliance with the 
national speed limit.  Each state was required to measure compliance with the federal limit.  
States that did not enforce 50% compliance with the limit were penalized by a 10 % reduction in 
federal highway funding.  By 1987 dissatisfaction with the federally imposed (and enforced) 
national maximum speed limit led Congress to modify the law to permit states to set speed limits 
of 65 mph on rural interstate highways only.  It seems likely that this dissatisfaction reflected the 
political important driver’s inability to optimally balance travel times and fatality rates.   
Even with the end of the concern for fuel conservation, the national maximum speed limit 
was retained in some form until repeal in 1995.  Despite opposition, especially from Western 
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 states, much of the support for national speed limits may have resulted from the unintended 
impact that this law appeared to have on motor vehicle fatalities.  Figure 1 shows the history of 
fatalities per vehicle mile traveled (vmt) from 1966-93.  It is apparent that fatalities per mile 
traveled have been declining during this entire period, but the decline of 15 percent (nearly 
10,000 fatalities) immediately following passage of the 1974 Emergency Highway Energy 
Conservation Act is the largest ever recorded in a single year and it was widely remarked upon at 
the time. 
Before proceeding, some clarification of the legislative history may be necessary.  In 
1995 Congress eliminated entirely the federal regulation of speed limits.  By the end of 1997 
only three states maintained a 55 mph speed limit on rural interstates: 20 states had rural 
interstate speed limits of 65 mph, 16 were at 70 mph, 10 at 75 mph, and Montana had no daytime 
speed limit, returning to its policy in 1973.   Uniform and reliable data on this later period is 
unavailable at this, and hence we do not examine these further changes in speed limits. 
B. Using the 1987 Institutional Change to Estimate the VSL 
By the end of 1987, 38 states raised the maximum speed limit on their rural interstates 
and three more joined in 1988.  Three states (including Washington D.C.) had no rural interstate 
highways on which to adjust speed limits, and a final seven states maintained a 55 mph speed 
limit on all road systems into the 1990s.
7  Figure 2 graphically displays the location of the states 
that retained the 55 mph speed limit on rural interstates in the period following 1987.  It is 
apparent that these states are clustered closely together in the more densely populated and 
wealthy northeast section of the U.S.  
We use this institutional change to study the trade off between the value of time saved 
and risk.  We compare changes in speeds and fatalities on rural interstates across states that did 
and did not adopt the 65 mph limit.  In view of the geographic clustering documented in Figure 
2, it is possible that such comparisons would capture effects that were a result of geography only.  
                                                 
7 The seven states that maintained the 55 mph speed limit on rural interstates were: Connecticut, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.  Three states 
(Delaware, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii) did not have roads classified as rural interstates 
throughout this period.  The remaining 41 states adopted the 65 mph limit.  Although Alaska is 
in this latter category, it will be ignored in the subsequent analysis because its rural interstates 
are not comparable to those in other states. 
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 However, because speed limits were permitted to increase only on rural interstates, we also make 
comparisons within states between the changes on rural interstates and other highways. 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that legislators had plenty of evidence with 
which to assess the consequences of a change in the speed limit on fatality rates and speeds.  
First, it was well understood that speed can increase the incidence of accidents by reducing 
reaction times and that it can increase the severity of crashes because of the physical relationship 
between mass and speed to energy.  Second, the National Research Council provided a review of 
the effects of the national maximum speed limit in 1984.  The report concludes that the 55 mph 
speed limit was responsible for 3,000 to 5,000 fewer traffic fatalities annually and a sharp 
decrease in mean speeds on rural interstates (NRC 1984).   
Third, state governments also had access to more than a dozen studies of individual 
state’s experiences with speed limits and roughly 10 studies from foreign countries.  All of these 
studies were completed by the mid-1980s, and their estimates of the impacts of speed limits were 
similar to those produced by the NRC (NRC 1984).  Consequently, it seems reasonable to 
assume that legislators were aware of the trade-offs that they were choosing for their 
constituents.  
  The more difficult question is whose preferences determine state government’s decisions 
about speed limits.  Our approach assumes that the decisions reflect the median voter’s/driver’s 
marginal willingness to trade-off wealth for an increase in the probability of death.  Since drivers 
are both the recipients of the benefits (in reduced driving times) and the costs (an increased 
fatality risk) this seems plausible. It is possible, of course, that this is not the case.  For example, 
the adoption decision could be captured by a particular industry (e.g., trucking or insurance).  
This issue cannot be resolved definitively, but the results from the estimation of equation (9) for 
the probability of adoption reported below do support the hypothesis that the adoption decision is 
more likely to be made when it is in the interests of the median voter’s/driver’s preferences.  
III. Data Sources and Description 
A.  Data Collection 
Our data on vehicle miles traveled (vmt), fatal accidents, and vehicle speeds come from 
several sources and reflect considerable effort.  Vehicle miles traveled are readily available by 
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 state and road type from the Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Statistics.
8  These data 
are collected by taking annual average traffic counts on segments of highways between two entry 
and/or exit points and multiplying the traffic counts by the length of the highway segments. 
Fatalities are available from the Fatal Accident Reporting System, which provides a 
census of all fatal vehicle crashes in the United States.  This reporting system is maintained by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and is based on information obtained from 
state agencies on all accidents involving motor vehicles traveling on public highways that result 
in the death of one or more person.
9 
Prior to 1981 speeds were monitored by radar.  Since that time speed monitoring has been 
done primarily with wire loops embedded in highway pavement.  Loop monitors are difficult to 
detect, are not used for enforcement, provide better nighttime speed monitoring, and are 
generally more consistent across locations than radar monitors.  We therefore confine our 
analysis of speeds (and fatalities) to the period since 1981. 
Collecting data on travel speeds is considerably more difficult.  From 1976 through 1994 
the Federal Highway Administration required states to monitor speeds on highways that were 
posted at 55 mph.  However, because the provisions requiring the report of speeds pertained only 
to highways posted at 55 mph, many states that increased speed limits on rural interstates 
discontinued collection of speed data on these roads in 1987. 
Some of the 65 mph adopting states did continue to collect speed data after 1987 but did 
not report them to the federal government.  We contacted all state departments of transportation 
and asked for whatever data existed on rural interstate speeds.  Twenty-one of the forty-one 
states that increased rural interstate speed limits in 1987 and 1988 provided the necessary data, 
and it is these data that provide the basis for our analysis.
 10  The other states continued to collect 
speed data in accordance with federal regulations. 
                                                 
8 Highway Statistics, Table VM-2, Federal Highway Administration, various issues. 
9 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Traffic Safety CD-ROM: 1996, Fatal Accident Reporting 
System: 1975-1994, U.S. Department of Transportation. 
10 The 21 states that adopted the 65 mph speed limit and provided post-1987 speed data are: 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
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 Figure 2 displays the geographic location of the 21 states that increased their rural 
interstate speed limits in 1987 and for which we have been able to obtain data on the speeds 
actually traveled before and after 1987.  It is apparent that the states for which we do have data 
are widely dispersed across the U.S.  Nevertheless, we suspect that the states for which data are 
not available may have been those that were most anxious to eliminate speed enforcement and 
reporting requirements.  This suggests that the observed speed increases in the states that we can 
monitor may be smaller than what occurred in the states that we couldn’t monitor.  Unless the 
relationship between fatalities and speeds is different in states that we can and cannot monitor, 
however, this should not affect our empirical analysis. 
B.  Summary Statistics  
Table 1 provides some of the basic descriptive statistics for our data.  Column (1) reports 
summary information for the 21 states that adopted the 65 mph speed limit on rural interstates 
and column (2) contains the data from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph speed.  Column (3) 
contains the available information for the 19 states that adopted the higher limit but did not 
provide us with speed data.     
The first panel reports the mean of fatalities, fatality rates, and speeds for three categories 
of roads and of fatalities and fatality rates across all roads from the years 1982-93.  The fatality 
rate and speed entries are calculated as the weighted mean, where the weight is vehicle miles of 
travel.  The three road categories are rural interstates, rural arterials, and urban interstates.  These 
latter two roads are chosen, because they generally have speed limits of 55 mph and design 
features that closely resemble those of rural interstates.
11  It is appealing to have similar roads 
within adopting states, because they provide better comparisons within adopting states.  
A few regularities emerge from this panel.  First the fatality rate, which is measured as 
the number of fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles of travel, is greater in adopting states than 
in non-adopting ones across the three roadtypes and statewide.  Second, average speeds are 
highest on rural interstates although they are similar on the three roadtypes.  Third, rural and 
                                                 
11 Both rural and urban interstate roads have multiple lanes, with traffic separated by direction 
and controlled access.  Rural arterials generally have one lane in each direction, but they have 
wide lanes and shoulder lanes.  Access to them is less controlled than to interstates, but more 
than to any other type of road.  See National Research Council (1984).       
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 urban interstates are substantially safer than rural arterials and than the statewide averages.   
Fourth, the statewide totals indicate that fatalities on rural interstates comprise a small fraction of 
total fatalities.  Within the states in our sample, these roads accounted for 2.5% and 5.0% of all 
traffic fatalities in non-adopting and adopting states, respectively. 
The second panel displays mean characteristics of the three sets of states in the years 
(1982-86) preceding the passage of the federal legislation.  Of especial interest are comparisons 
among the states that adopted the 65 mph speed limit and the states that retained the 55 mph 
speed limit.  It is apparent that the states that adopted the 65 mph speed limit generally had 
higher fatality rates and speeds.  This is true for both sets of 65 mph states.  To the extent that 
level differences predict changes, these differences demonstrate the importance of the 
availability of intra-state comparisons.   
It is also evident that on average adopting states had lower wage rates and lower traffic 
densities in 1986.  It is noteworthy that wage rates and traffic densities are virtually identical in 
the two sets of adopting states in columns (1) and (3).  Overall, these data suggest that traffic 
densities and wage rates may be related to the probability that a state will adopt the 65 mph 
speed limit, and we explore this possibility in more detail below.   
C.  Unadjusted Estimates of the Effects of the 65 mph Speed Limit 
Figure 3 disaggregates the fatality rate data from the first panel of Table 1.  It presents 
annual mean fatality rates on rural interstates from 1982-1993 for states that adopted (the solid 
line) the 65 mph speed limit and states (the dotted line) that retained the 55 mph limit for which 
speed data is also available.
12  The figure confirms that prior to 1987 fatality rates were higher on 
rural interstates in adopting states, and generally had declined in these years in both sets of states.  
The year-to-year variability in fatality rates is also evident and cautions against inferences based 
on a few years.  It is evident that after the higher speed limit was introduced, fatality rates in the 
55 mph states continued their downward trend, while fatality rates in the adopting states 
                                                 
12 The annual mean fatality rates are calculated as the weighted mean in adopting and non-
adopting states, respectively, where the weight is vehicle miles of travel.  An unweighted version 
of this figure leads to the same qualitative conclusions.   
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 remained relatively constant.  The figure suggests that the 65 mph speed limit is associated with 
a substantial relative increase in fatality rates. 
Figure 4 provides an analogous depiction of trends in annual mean speed in the two sets 
of states.  Prior to 1987 average speeds were approximately equal in the adopting and non-
adopting states, although they were trending up at a modestly greater rate among adopters.  The 
most striking feature of the figure is the upward mean shift in average speeds that is immediately 
visible in 1987.
13  This mean shift cannot be explained by a continuation of the pre-existing 
trends.  Since average speeds were considerably higher than the permitted 55 mph when the new 
limit was adopted, it is not surprising that the increase in vehicular speeds was considerably less 
than the 10 mph that some might have expected.  Moreover, traffic density may also have limited 
the increase in speeds  
A simple analysis of the impact of adopting the 65 mph speed limit on rural interstates is 
contained in the top panel of Table 2A.  Columns (1) and (2) report mean fatality rates and 
speeds from 1982-86 (“pre-period”) and 1988-93 (“post-period”) and the change between these 
two periods in adopting and non-adopting states respectively.  Column (3) contains the 
difference between the entries within each row for the two sets of states.  Consequently, the 
entries in column (3) of the “Change” sub-panel are the unadjusted difference in differences 
(DD) estimates of the effect of the 65 mph speed limit on fatality rates and speeds.   
The “Change” sub-panel documents that fatality rates declined by 0.041 and 0.226 on 
rural interstates in adopting and non-adopting states on rural interstates, respectively.  Speeds 
increased in both adopting and non-adopting states, but the increase was almost 150% larger in 
adopting states.  Thus, the unadjusted DD estimators suggest that the adoption of the 65 mph 
speed limit increased fatality rates by 0.185 and speeds by 2.8 mph on rural interstates.
14  
                                                 
13 In Figure 3 the relative increase in fatality rates is not evident until 1988, but in Figure 4 the 
increase in speeds is observable in 1987.   This difference is because most states initially applied 
the 65 mph limit during the summer of 1987 and speed data is collected on the calendar year, 
while fatality data is based on the federal fiscal year that ends on September 30.  
14 Lave (1997) argues that the 65 mph speed limit induced an increase in fatalities on rural 
interstates and a decrease on other roads so that statewide the 65 mph speed limit did not 
increase fatalities.  Greenstone (2002) reexamines this hypothesis and is unable to find evidence 
that the 65 mph speed limit caused a decrease in fatality rates on other roads. 
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 The same analysis applied to the data on urban interstate and rural arterial roads is 
contained in the bottom two panels of Table 2A.  These data indicate that fatality rates decreased 
modestly more in adopting states than non-adopting ones on both categories of roads.
15  If this 
relative decline is due to a state-specific factor, then these roads should be used as an intra-state 
comparison.  It is evident that controlling for this decline will increases the magnitude of the 
estimated effect of the 65 mph limit on fatalities.  The subsequent analysis presents estimates that 
do and do not use these roads as controls.   
There is no relative pattern in the speed data as average speeds increased at about the 
same rate in adopting and non-adopting states on these roadtypes.  Interestingly, the speed data 
contradict the popular “spillover” hypothesis that higher speed limits on one road cause drivers 
to increase their driving speed on all roads.   
Table 2B presents two different methods to calculate unadjusted DD estimators.  The 
column (1) entries are the unadjusted DD estimates from Table 2A, normalized by the pre-period 
level in adopting states.  In the case of rural interstates, they indicate that the adoption of the 
higher limit is associated with increases of 13.0% in the fatality rate and 4.7% in speed.  The 
changes in fatality rates and speed are –5.9% and –0.9% on urban interstates and –3.2% and 
0.9% on rural arterials, respectively.   
Although calculations such as those in column (1) are common, the resulting estimate is 
sensitive to the choice of denominator when there are pre-period differences in the levels.  For 
example, the increase in the fatality rate on rural interstates is approximately 50% larger when 
the raw DD estimates are normalized by the pre-period level in non-adopting states.  This is 
because the pre-period fatality rate is roughly 50% higher in adopting states.  Since the pre-
period speeds on rural interstates are approximately equal, this issue does not apply to the 
column (1) speed effect.   
                                                 
15 The DD estimators of the effects of the 65 mph speed limit are generally insensitive to 
weighting.  The principal exception is the effect on urban interstate fatality rates.  In the 
unweighted case, the fatality rate declines by .203 more in adopting states.  Greenstone (2000) 
found a similar relative decline on non-interstate roads in urban areas, which suggests that there 
is an unobserved factor (e.g., an improvement in the safety of the fleet of cars) that caused the 
larger declines on all urban roads in adopting states. 
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 Column (2) reports the results of the application of the DD estimator applied to the ln 
transformation of the raw, state by roadtype by year data.  The ln difference approach is the only 
measure of relative change that is symmetric, additive and normed (Tornqvist, Vartia, and Vartia 
1985).  In contrast to the column (1) estimates, these estimates are independent of the units of 
measurement (and differences in the pre-period levels).  These estimates of the effects of the 65 
mph limit on rural interstates are increases of 0.311 and 0.045 ln points for the fatality rate and 
speed, respectively.  The estimated changes on urban interstates are –0.063 and –0.009 ln points 
and 0.005 and 0.008 on rural arterials. 
In general, the column (1) and (2) entries are approximately equal.  The most glaring 
exception is the case of the fatality rate on rural interstates, where the difference in the estimators 
is due to the differences in the pre-period levels.
16  This is troubling because our estimate of the 
trade-off between the monetary value of time and fatalities is proportional to changes in the 
fatality effect.  Consequently, functional form assumptions are more important than we would 
like.  We focus on the results that use the ln transformation, because this method is independent 
of the pre-period differences.  But, the subsequent analysis also reports results when the fatality 
rates and speed are untransformed. 
IV.  Econometric Framework 
 
This section discusses the econometric models used to estimate how individual’s trade-off 
time spent traveling against the probability of a fatality.  The equation of interest is:   
(11)  ln (Hours of Travel)srt = β ln (vmt)srt + θ ln (Fatalities)srt + υsrt, 
where  υsrt = αsr + ηrt + µst + νsrt.  Here, s references state, r indicates roadtype, and t indexes 
year.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hours of travel (that is, the reciprocal of 
the average speed multiplied by vmt) and ln (vmt)srt, the natural logarithm of vehicle miles of 
travel, is a control.  Thus the parameter of interest, θ, measures the elasticity of time with respect 
to fatalities, holding constant vmt.   
                                                 
16 Differences in the pre-period means is also relevant for the calculation of the fatality effect on 
rural arterials where the mean fatality rate was 18% greater in adopting states from 1982-86. 
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   As the specification of the error term indicates, there are a number of potential sources of 
bias.  When the sample is limited to a single roadtype (e.g., rural interstates), it is possible to 
include unrestricted state-roadtype (αsr) and roadtype-year (ηrt) effects.  We would like to be able 
to include covariates (e.g., characteristics of the drivers and their cars) at the state-roadtype-year 
level, but to the best of our knowledge such data is not collected.  As an alternative, we can non-
parametrically control for all state-year (µst) factors when the sample includes multiple 
roadtypes.  Thus in the multiple roadtype samples, the estimated elasticity is robust to permanent 
factors specific to these state-road combinations (e.g., the quality of the road or the average 
number of days in a year with unsafe driving conditions due to bad weather), transitory factors 
common to a roadtype (e.g., federal expenditures to improve rural interstates), and transitory 
factors common to roadtypes within a state (e.g., state-level economic conditions or a change in a 
drunk driving laws).
17  However, it is not robust to time varying state-roadtype determinants of 
fatalities.   
  We estimated equation (11) by ordinary least squares, separately on data from rural 
interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials.  The specification includes state-roadtype and 
roadtype-year effects.  The estimated elasticities (standard errors) from these regressions are       
-0.003 (.007), 0.006 (.005), and 0.005 (.007), respectively.  The estimated elasticity is nearly 
identical when the sample is expanded to include all three roadtypes and the specification 
includes state by year effects.   
These results indicate that in ordinary cross-section regression speeds and fatalities are 
virtually uncorrelated.  Although this may seem puzzling at first, it is not very surprising.  After 
all, people will choose to travel more slowly in order to reduce the likelihood of a fatality when a 
road is unsafe (e.g., due to poor weather).
18  This illustrates the difficulty of making causal 
inferences when there is no exogenous variability in the data.  Overall, these results are 
                                                 
17 For example, Keeler (1994), Ruhm (1996), and Dee (1999) show that state-level alcohol taxes 
and minimum age drinking laws may influence alcohol consumption and consequently traffic 
fatalities. 
18 The absence of variation that is unrelated to unobserved factors may explain why previous 
research has been unable to establish a systematic relationship between speed and fatalities.  See 
Lave (1985), Levy and Asch (1989), Fowles and Loeb (1989), Snyder (1989), and Lave (1989). 
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 consistent with the possibility that the estimated θ is biased upwards due to individuals’ 
compensatory behavior.   
  One solution to this identification problem is to find a variable that causes changes in 
speed but doesn’t affect fatalities, except through speed.  A plausible instrument is whether the 
65 mph speed limit was in force.  In this case, the instrumental variables estimate of the elasticity 
of time with respect to fatalities is a simple function of two reduced-form relations, the effects of 
the 65 mph speed limit on Fatalities and Hours of Travel:   
    (12a)  ln (Fatalities)srt = λF ln (vmt)srt + ΠF 1(65 mph limit in force)srt + εsrt 
(12b)  ln (Hours of Travel)srt = λH ln (vmt)srt + ΠH 1(65 mph limit in force)srt + ε’srt, 
where θIV = ΠH/ΠF.
19  The indicator variable 1(65 mph limit in force)srt is equal to 1 if the 
observation is from a road where 65 mph is the posted speed limit.
20  The error terms are 
specified identically to υsrt so the estimation of these equations can include the same set of fixed 
effects.  
Two sufficient conditions for the IV estimator (θIV) to provide a consistent estimate of the 
elasticity of time with respect to fatalities are ΠF ≠ 0 and E[εsrt υsrt,] = 0.  From Tables 2A and 2B 
and Figure 3, it is evident that the first condition holds.  The second condition requires that 
unobserved determinants of speed are orthogonal to a state’s decision to raise speed limits in 
1987, conditional on the roadtype-year, state-roadtype and state-year fixed effects.  This latter 
condition cannot be tested. 
V.  Estimates of V, the Monetary Value of Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
This section uses the econometric framework outlined above to estimate three causal 
relationships: the effect of the 65 mph speed limit on fatalities, holding constant vmt; the effect 
of the 65 mph speed limit on hours of travel, holding constant vmt; and the time saved per 
                                                 
19 We used the Box-Cox method to find the transformation of y (i.e., the dependent variables) in 
the reduced-form equations so that y
λ is approximately normally distributed.  In the case of 
equation (12a), the estimate of λ is .5346 with a 95% confidence interval of {.3980, .6810} so 
both the linear and ln transformation are rejected.  In contrast, the null hypothesis that the ln 
transformation is correct cannot be rejected for equation (12b).  
20 This variable is set to 1 in all years after 1987.  For observations from 1987, it is equal to the 
fraction of the calendar year that the 65 mph limit was in force. 
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 marginal fatality.  The first two “reduced-form” relationships are of interest in their own right as 
part of an evaluation of the effects of speed limit policies.  In the context of our theoretical 
model, the latter is the key structural relation and provides an upper bound estimate of the value 
of a statistical life.   
A. Estimated Effects of the 65 mph Speed Limit on Fatalities and Speeds 
Table 3 provides our basic empirical estimates of the proportionate effect of the adoption 
of the 65 mph speed limit on fatalities.  They are obtained from the fitting of equation (12a).  The 
first column provides estimates of the effect of adoption on fatalities on rural interstates.  The 
first seven rows present estimates from separate regressions where the sample includes data from 
1982-86 and one of the years that the higher limit was in force.  The estimate in the eighth row is 
obtained from the full sample and is an average effect across all years.  The standard errors of the 
estimates are in parentheses and are corrected for unspecified heteroskedasticity (White 1980).
21  
The second and third columns of the table provide estimates of the effect of the adoption of the 
65 mph speed limit on fatalities on urban interstates and rural arterial roads in the adopting 
states.  These results provide a more formal test of whether there are transitory state level factors 
that bias the estimates in the first column. 
The results in the first column of Table 3 indicate that, in all years when the speed limit 
was in force for the entire year, fatalities on rural interstates increased by more in the states 
adopting higher speed limits than in those that did not.
22  In many cases the individual estimated 
effects would be judged statistically significant by conventional test criteria.  The bottom panel 
provides an estimate that, because it pools the data for all the years, is considerably more 
precisely determined than the separate effects estimated by year.  This summary result indicates 
that the adoption of the 65 mph speed limit increased fatalities by about 36% (measured in ln 
points) on rural interstates.  
                                                 
21 Unless otherwise noted, all the standard errors in the subsequent analysis are corrected for 
unspecified heteroskedasticity.  
22 Our estimate of the 1990 fatality effect is .268 ln points, which translates to a 30.7% increase 
in fatalities.  It is noteworthy that a U.S. Department of Transportation report that evaluated the 
impact of the 65 mph speed limit on fatalities in 1990 concluded that the fatality toll on rural 
interstates in adopting states was “30 percent greater than might have been expected” (U.S. 
Department of Transportation 1992). 
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 In contrast, the results from urban interstates and rural arterials show little evidence of a 
systematic change in fatality rates in adopting states after 1986.  The estimated annual effects of 
the increased speed limit on these roads are small and generally would not be judged statistically 
significant at conventional test levels.  Further, there is not a consistent pattern to the signs of the 
estimates either within a roadtype over time or across the two roadtypes within a year.  The 
overall effects indicate that in adopting states there was a modest relative decline in the fatality 
rate on urban interstates and a small relative increase on rural arterials that would be judged 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Table 4 provides a precisely parallel analysis of the proportionate effect of the adoption 
of the 65 mph speed limit on the hours required to travel a mile (that is, the reciprocal of the 
average speed multiplied by vmt).  These are the results of fitting equation (12b).  It is striking 
that all but one of the annual effects is statistically significant at the 5% level or better.  When the 
data is pooled to include all years, the estimate indicates that the hours required to travel a mile 
decreased by about 4% (so speeds increased by about 2.5 mph) on rural interstates as a result of 
the speed limit increase.  Speeds on urban interstates and rural arterial roads were unaffected by 
the speed limit change.  All of these estimated effects are quite precisely determined in a 
statistical sense. 
Table 5 examines the sensitivity of the estimated effects of increased speed limits on 
fatalities and speeds, using various alternative specifications.  Road types are pooled for the 
analysis in different ways, as shown by the row labels.  In the multiple roadtype samples, the 
specifications include an indicator for observations from any road in a state-year when the 65 
mph limit was in force on that state’s rural interstates.  However, the reported coefficient is again 
from an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from rural interstates in a state-year when 65 
mph was the posted limit.     
Three different specifications are fit.  The specification in column (1) constrains the year 
indicators to be equal across roadtypes.  In column (2), these year indicators are replaced with 
year-roadtype dummies.  The specification in column (3) may be of particular interest, because it 
includes state-year indicators. 
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 These estimates provide some sense of the extent to which the quantitative magnitudes of 
the estimated effects are dependent on the precise specification of the econometric model.  In 
principle, if the quantitative magnitude of the estimates is not affected by the precise 
specification of the model, then the pooling of the data may result in a more precise estimator.  In 
fact, as the table indicates, the estimated effect of the increased speed limit on fatalities is 
between 24% and 42% and not very sensitive to the precise specification.
23  L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  
estimated effect of the increased speed limit on hours required to travel a mile is between 3.0% 
and 4.1%, and it also is not very sensitive to the precise specification.
24  
Thus far the analysis has attempted to obtain the causal effects of the adoption of the 65 
mph speed limit on fatalities and travel times.  But these estimates are unlikely to be the 
structural relationships between speed limits and these two outcomes.  We suspect that the 
adoption of the higher speed limit may be accompanied by other changes that are unobservable 
to us but are intended to affect these outcomes.  For example, states may accompany the 
introduction of higher speed limits with alterations in state trooper behavior that limit the 
increase in speeds and/or fatalities.  Further, the higher speed limit may induce changes in the 
variance of speed that could have an independent effect on fatality rates (Lave 1985).  The 
available data does not permit an investigation of whether such relationships underlie the above 
estimates, but such an investigation is unnecessary for our purposes.  The important issue is that 
the adoption of the higher speed limit provided the median voter/driver a trade-off between 
increased fatalities and reduced travel times, whatever the precise mechanism.  
                                                 
23 Although speed data is missing for 19 of the 40 adopting states, these states’ fatality data is 
available.  Across a variety of specifications, the increase in fatalities on rural interstates in these 
adopting states was approximately 0.08 ln points higher than in other adopting states.  This 
difference was generally significant at the 10% level but not when stricter criteria are applied. 
24 We experimented with adding state-specific and state by roadtype-specific linear time trends 
to the specifications presented in Table 5.  For both fatalities and hours required to travel a mile, 
the exclusion of a state-specific time trend in columns (1) and (2) is rejected by F-tests.  In these 
specifications, the effect of the 65 mph speed limit is essentially unchanged and its standard error 
is modestly smaller.  Although an F-test rejects the exclusion of state by roadtype linear time 
trends in columns (1), (2), and (3), this model appears to be “overparameterized.”  In particular, 
the standard errors on the indicator for the 65 mph speed limit increase by 50%-100%.   
Nevertheless, the fatality effect remains approximately constant and statistically significant at the 
5% level.  The hours point estimate declines by roughly ½ and would not be judged significant at 
conventional levels. 
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 B. Estimates of the Trade-off Between the Value of Hours Saved and Fatalities  
Tables 6A and 6B present the results from the estimation of two versions of equation 
(11).  In both cases, an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is used as an 
instrumental variable for the fatalities variable.  The results are obtained from the same 10 
combinations of specifications and samples as in Table 5.  For each regression, the table reports 
the IV parameter estimate on the fatality variable, the heteroskedastic consistent standard error in 
parentheses, and the implied estimate of the monetary value of the time saved per marginal 
fatality, V, in square brackets. 
In Table 6A the dependent variables is ln (Hours of Travel) and the explanatory variable 
of interest is ln (Fatalities).  As in equation (11), the specification also includes ln (vmt) as a 
control.  Consequently, the reported parameters are the estimated elasticity of hours required to 
travel a mile with respect to fatalities.  Since the estimated effect is exactly identified, the 
estimates from a particular specification and sample are the ratio of the estimate in the second 
panel to the estimate in the first panel from the same sample and specification in Table 5.   
Across all of the samples and specifications, the fitting of this equation yields a relatively 
narrow range of estimates of the elasticity and, in turn, V.  The elasticities are between -0.076 
and -0.166, implying that a 10% increase in fatalities is associated with a 0.76% to 1.66% 
reduction in travel times.  These estimates would generally be judged statistically significantly 
different from zero at conventional test levels.   
The estimated V’s range from $1.11 million to $2.42 million.
25  Our preferred estimate of 
V is the weighted average of the estimates from the rural interstate only sample and the column 
(3) specification with all three roadtypes in the sample, where the weight is the inverse of the 
standard errors on the elasticities.  This summary measure of V is $1.54 million.  Other estimates 
will be higher or lower, depending on the precise parameters used, and some readers may prefer 
to make different calculations. 
                                                 
25 The estimates of V are obtained by multiplying the relevant elasticity by the ratio of hours 
traveled to total fatalities in adopting states from 1982-86 (6.122 billion/5,187) and by the 
average wage rate in adopting states in 1986 ($12.33 in 1997$). 
  22 
 In Table 6B mean speed is the dependent variable and the explanatory variable of interest 
is the fatality rate.  This equation is weighted by vmt.  As discussed in the context of Table 2B, 
this approach is not independent of differences in pre-period levels.  The sensitivity of the 
estimates to differences in the pre-period fatality rates is evidenced by the greater variability in 
the estimates of V as the sample is changed within each of the columns.  In this untransformed 
case, the “first-stage” fatality effect is generally smaller (recall Table 2B) so the estimates of V 
are larger on average.
26  Overall, these estimates of V range from $1.39 million to $8.91 
million.
27     
VI.  Estimates of V*, the Value of a Statistical Life 
As noted in the theoretical framework, the estimate of V, the trade-off between the value 
of hours saved and a marginal fatality provides only an upper bound to the value of a statistical 
life.  In this subsection, we report on our efforts to empirically implement the theoretical model 
and obtain an estimate of the value of a statistical life, V*. 
We begin by obtaining state-by-state estimates of V for the 21 adopting states that 
provided speed data.  The first six columns of Table 7 present state-by-state estimates and 
standard errors of the effects of the 65 mph speed limit on fatalities and the time required to 
travel a mile (cols. 1-4) and the IV elasticity between time saved and fatalities (cols. 5-6).  These 
are obtained from fitting versions of equations (12a), (12b), and (11), respectively, that include 
the logarithm of vmt interacted with roadtype and state-roadtype, roadtype-year, and state-year 
fixed effects as controls.  The sample for each of these regressions includes observations on rural 
interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit 
and the state for which the estimate applies.  Column (7) reports the state-specific estimates of 
V.
28  
                                                 
26 The “reduced form” results are available from the authors upon request. 
27 In order to obtain these estimates of V, the parameter estimates are converted into elasticities.  
This is done by multiplying the parameter estimates by the ratio of the mean fatality rate to the 
mean speed in adopting states (1.423/59.6) during the 1982-86 period.  The estimate of V is then 
obtained as described in footnote 25.  
28 The state-specific estimates of V are obtained by multiplying the elasticities by the state-
specific ratio of hours traveled to total fatalities and the state-specific mean hourly wage. 
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 Although the parameter estimates from the state-specific regressions are relatively 
imprecise, they almost all have the expected sign.   The estimated effects of the higher limit on 
fatalities range from -0.039 (Indiana) to 0.656 (South Dakota) ln points, while the speed effects 
range from 0.033 (Arkansas) to -0.084 (Colorado).  18 of the 21 IV elasticities have a negative 
sign, but only 3 of them would be judged statistically significant at conventional levels.  The 
estimated value of time saved per marginal fatality (i.e., V) ranges from -$1.12 million 
(Arkansas) to $9.71 million (Wisconsin) (1997$).  
Table 8 reports our efforts to use these estimated V’s to obtain a structural estimate of 
V*, the value of a statistical life.  The top panel contains estimates from the probit (recall 
equation (9)) model of the states’ likelihood of adopting the higher limit.  We assume that the 
hours saved per fatality will be lower the greater is the traffic density in a state, which implies 
that in the probit function traffic density will also be negatively related to the probability that a 
state will adopt the 65 mph speed limit.  We also suppose, in accord with some suggestive 
evidence surveyed by Viscusi (1993), that the value of a statistical life, V* in equation (7), may 
be positively related to the average wage rate in a state.  This implies that the average wage rate 
will have a negative effect on the probability that a state will adopt the 65 mph speed limit.   
  The probit function is fit to data on the probability of adoption of the 65 mph speed limit 
for the full 47 state sample.  The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that adoption 
of the 65 mph speed limit is negatively related to the available time savings.  This is suggested 
by the estimated coefficient on Traffic Density, which is roughly four times its estimated 
standard error.  The estimated effect of the average wage has the sign anticipated and would be 
judged statistically significant at the 10% level but not by stricter criteria.  These results are 
consistent with the assumption of our model that states’ decisions whether to adopt the higher 
limit reflect the preferences about benefits and costs of their median/driver voter. 
The middle panel presents estimates from modeling the monetary value of the time saved 
per marginal fatality, V.  As specified in equation (6), the control variables are traffic density and 
the inverse of the Mill’s Ratio, calculated using the probit results.  These two equations are 
estimated in a two-step estimation procedure (rather than jointly), because we do not have 
estimates of V for 19 of the 40 adopting states but we do want to use data from those states to 
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 estimate the probit (Heckman 1979).  The estimation results from these two equations are used to 
calculate V*, which is reported in the bottom panel. 
The fitting of equation (6) requires the use of estimates of V as the dependent variable.  
The precision of these estimates depends on the precision of the estimates of the: IV elasticities, 
mean wages, mean speeds, and vmt.  An examination of the 21 estimated standard errors of the 
IV elasticities demonstrates one part of the variability in the precision.  Although their mean is 
0.164, the standard errors associated with the Oregon and Wisconsin elasticities are 0.536 and 
0.609, respectively.  Interestingly, these states’ estimated V’s are the two largest at $5.41 and 
$9.71 million.  It is evident that these two poorly estimated V’s are likely to have an important 
influence on the estimation of equation (6) and that the homoskedasticity assumption is not 
appealing.  
We take a number of approaches to remedy this problem of heteroskedasticity.  Column 
(1) is the result of unweighted least squares estimation, although the standard errors are corrected 
for unspecified heteroskedasticity (White 1980).  Column (2) weights the equation by the 
reciprocal of the standard errors of the IV elasticities and corrects the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity.  Column (3) reports median regression results.  And, column (4) presents the 
results from a robust regression routine.  This routine begins by excluding outliers, defined as 
observations with values of Cook’s D>1, and then weights observations based on absolute 
residuals so that large residuals are downweighted.
29  These estimation details are summarized in 
the row labels at the bottom of the table. 
  The results from modeling the state-specific values of V from Table 7 are mixed.  The 
sign of the parameter on the estimated inverse Mill’s Ratio is positive in 3 of the 4 specifications.  
                                                 
29 After the oulier observations are excluded, the routine obtains optimal weights for the 
remaining observations in an iterative process.  This process begins with the estimation of the 
linear regression on the restricted sample and the calculation of the estimated residuals from this 
regression.  These residuals are used to obtain weights so that observations with large absolute 
residuals are downweighted.  The regression is then fitted again using these weights and the 
residuals from this new regression are used to derive a new set of weights.  This iterative 
procedure continues until the change in weights is below 0.01.  Huber weights (Huber 1964) are 
used until convergence is achieved and then biweights (Beaton and Tukey 1974) are used until 
convergence is achieved with them.  Street, Carroll, and Ruppert (1998) provide a method to 
calculate the standard errors.  Also see Berk (1990) on robust regression. 
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 This is not surprising, because it indicates that states with higher values of V (for unobserved 
reasons) were more likely to adopt the 65 mph speed limit than would be predicted by the 
observable determinants of the adoption decision.  However, it is apparent that our estimates of 
this equation are poorly determined.  No doubt this is, in part, a result of the very imprecise 
estimates of V for individual states that make up the observations.   
Nevertheless, the bottom panel of Table 8 concludes our exercise and lists the estimates 
of the value of a statistical life associated with each of the four specifications.  These estimates 
are calculated at the mean of the 1986 mean hourly wages across adopting states.  In square 
brackets below the estimated V*, we list the parameter estimate from the constant in a regression 
of the V’s on only a constant.  They are presented in order to allow for comparisons of our 
estimates of V* to the mean and median of the V’s from the different procedures.  The 
estimation details in the row labels apply to this simple regression as well.   
The estimates of the value of a statistical life range from $.94 million to $1.54 million 
(1997$).  The relatively tight range of these estimates is reassuring.  In three of the four cases, 
these estimates of V* are less than the relevant estimates of the mean and median of the V’s as 
our structural model predicts.  However, we have not calculated a sampling error for these 
estimates of the value of a statistical life, but it would no doubt be very large. 
 
VII.  Interpretation 
The above estimates of the value of a statistical life are based on our analyses of fatalities 
and driving time saved from greater speeds.  These estimates have several additional conceptual 
limitations that deserve note.  In general, any underestimation of driving time saved, or 
overestimation of fatalities incurred, will lead to a downward biased estimate of the value of a 
statistical life.  Likewise, any underestimation or overestimation of the economic value of 
driving time saved will lead to similar biases in the value of a statistical life. 
There are plausible reasons for believing that some further adjustments in the estimates 
may be useful.  First, in our analysis we have assumed that each vehicle contains only one 
passenger, so that vehicle miles traveled are equivalent to passenger miles traveled.  In fact, as 
indicated in Table 9, the typical US vehicle contains 1.7 passengers.  If it could be assumed that 
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 the value of the time of each of these passengers was the same as the mean wage rate per state, 
and if it could be assumed that the number of passengers per vehicle was the same in each state, 
it would be appropriate to simply adjust all our estimates of the value of a statistical life upward 
by this amount.  
There are also reasons to believe that the wage rate may not be wholly appropriate as a 
measure of the value of the passenger time saved.  In particular, the wage rate is only one part of 
total compensation.  As Table 9 indicates, total compensation is typically 22% greater than the 
wage rate.  If it could be assumed that this additional compensation was variable by hour, then it 
would be appropriate to adjust our earlier estimates of the value of a statistical life upward 
accordingly.  
On the other hand, there is a long tradition in the literature on the economic valuation of 
travel time that suggests the wage rate may be an overestimate of the value of travel time saved 
(Beesley 1973).  Some of the most convincing evidence on this issue, however, is Deacon and 
Sonstelie’s (1985) analysis of drivers tolerance of waiting times (to obtain less expensive 
gasoline), which supports the use of the wage rate as a measure of the value of drivers’ time. 
At the present time, because of data limitations and the inherent subjectivity that would 
be added to our estimates, we do not think it is appropriate to simply modify the value of 
statistical life estimates given above using the adjustment factors in Table 9.  With better data, 
however, this may be appropriate at some further time. 
Finally, there now exist many estimates of the value of a statistical life both in the US and 
for other countries and, in fact, there are several surveys of these estimates, including those by 
Viscusi (1993, 2000), de Blaeij, et. al. (2000), and Blomquist (2001).  As a general rule these 
studies suggest that average valuations across studies typically fall in the range of $1.0 to $5.0 
million, although individual studies often provide estimates far outside this range.  Our estimates 
virtually all fall within this range and we think they provide fairly strong evidence that the more 
extreme valuations sometimes reported are likely to be a result of one or more conceptual or 
econometric problems. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
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   Although subject to a number of limitations, our estimates of the value of a statistical life 
fall in the range between $1 million and $10 million, and our preferred estimates are much closer 
to the former than the latter.  We think these estimates are a particularly credible indication of 
public attitudes toward the tradeoff between wealth and fatality risk.  First, these estimates are 
based on the exogenously offered opportunity for states to vote an increase in their rural speed 
limit and thereby save vehicle travel time at the risk of increased fatalities.  Second, the nature of 
the risk/wealth tradeoff poses a relatively simple public choice decision where voters receive 
both the benefits and suffer the costs, and where agency problems and the resulting distortions 
are not likely to be strong.  Finally, there is evidence the state legislators were aware of the 
tradeoffs involved and that the states that implicitly were offered better terms (greater hours 
saved per fatality) were more likely to accept the offer. 
Based on these results it appears that measuring the choices that result from exogenous 
changes in the tradeoff between safety and wealth are the key to providing real progress in 
estimating the value of a statistical life.  As would be expected, where drivers select their speeds 
and thus their fatality risks in response to road conditions, the simple cross-section correlation 
between speeds and fatality risks is negligible.  On the other hand, both speeds and fatality risks 
increase in response to an exogenous change in speed limits, providing just the information 
critical to the credible measurement of the value of a statistical life. 
Our results also indicate that there is room for much additional research in the valuation 
of safety risks.  Recent years have seen the demise of all federally mandated speed limits and the 
evolution of considerable variability within states and across states in traffic safety legislation.  
In principle, this variability could be used to measure the terms of wealth/risk tradeoffs at 
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 Table 1: Sample Statistics for States that were Eligible to Raise 
the Speed Limit on Rural Interstates in 1987 
  States Included in the Analysis Excluded  States 
  Adopted 65 Mph Retained 55 Mph Adopted 65 Mph
  (1) (2) (3) 
Number  of  States  21 7 19 
Entire Period (1982-93)     
Rural  Interstates     
  Fatalities  57.3  24.3  55.6 
  Fatality Rate  1.390  0.839  1.529 
  Speed (Mph)  62.4  60.4  Unavailable 
Urban  Interstates     
  Fatalities  41.0  53.5  41.9 
  Fatality Rate  0.748  0.747  0.992 
  Speed (Mph)  57.5  58.8  58.3 
Rural  Arterials     
  Fatalities  228.5  168.9  215.8 
  Fatality Rate  3.357  2.844  3.411 
  Speed (Mph)  56.5  54.4  55.8 
Statewide  Totals     
  Fatalities  988.5  948.8  838.9 
  Fatality Rate  2.289  1.922  2.331 
Pre-Period (1982-1986)     
1986 Hourly Wage (1997$)  $12.33  $13.97  $12.33 
1986 Rural Int. Traffic Density  0.0604  0.0929  0.0597 
Rural Int. Fatality Rate  1.423  0.957  1.592 
Rural Int. Speed (Mph)  59.5  59.3  60.2 
Notes: The Fatality Rate is calculated as the number of fatalities per 100 million vehicle-
miles of travel.  Both the Fatality Rate and Speed entries are calculated as the weighted 
mean within each of the three categories of states, where the weight is the vehicle miles 
of travel on the relevant road(s).  Traffic Density is vehicle miles of travel per miles of 
paved road lanes.  The mean hourly wage in 1986 is calculated from the 1986 Current 
Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group.  It is calculated from all workers that report 
an hourly wage greater than $2.50.  The survey top-codes the hourly wages of workers 
that are paid on an hourly basis at $99.99.  We constructed an hourly wage for workers 
that are not paid hourly and also top-coded it at $99.99.  The Fatalities, Hourly Wage and 
Traffic Density entries are the mean across states within each category.  See the text and 
Figure 2 for the identity of the states in each category. 
 
 Table 2A: Mean Fatality Rates and Speeds by Roadtype, Period, and Adopter Status 
  Adopted 65 Mph Retained 55 Mph Adopters - Non-Adopters
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Rural Interstates (Affected Roadtype) 
Pre-Period (1982-1986)       
  Fatality Rate  1.423  0.957  0.466 
  Speed (Mph)  59.6  59.3  0.3 
Post-Period (1988-1993)       
  Fatality Rate  1.382  0.731  0.651 
  Speed (Mph)  64.3  61.2  3.1 
Change (Post - Pre Period)     
  Fatality Rate  -0.041  -0.226  0.185 
  Speed (Mph)  4.7  1.9  2.8 
Urban Interstates (Unaffected Roadtype) 
Pre-Period (1982-1986)       
  Fatality Rate  0.887  0.843  0.044 
  Speed (Mph)  56.9  57.9  -1.0 
Post-Period (1988-1993)       
  Fatality Rate  0.662  0.670  -0.008 
  Speed (Mph)  57.9  59.4  -1.5 
Change (Post - Pre Period)     
  Fatality Rate  -0.225  -0.173  -0.052 
  Speed (Mph)  1.0  1.5  -0.5 
Rural Arterials (Unaffected Roadtype) 
Pre-Period (1982-1986)       
  Fatality Rate  3.785  3.195  0.590 
  Speed (Mph)  55.4  53.7  1.7 
Post-Period (1988-1993)       
  Fatality Rate  2.978  2.511  0.467 
  Speed (Mph)  57.2  55.0  2.2 
Change (Post - Pre Period)     
  Fatality Rate  -0.807  -0.684  -0.123 
  Speed (Mph)  1.8  1.3  0.5 
See Notes to Table 1.  In columns (1) and (2), the Fatality rate and the Speed variables are 
calculated as the weighted mean across states for each category of road in the Pre-Period and 
Post-Period panels, where vehicle miles of travel is the weight.  The entries in the Change 
panel are the difference between the Post-Period and Pre-Period means.  Column (3) presents 
the difference of the column (1) and (2) entries for each row. Table 2B: Difference in Differences Estimates of 65 Mph Speed Limit on Fatality Rates and Speeds 
  DD of Levels Normalized by  DD of Natural Logarithms 
  Pre-Period Level in Adopting States  
 (1) (2) 
Rural Interstates (Affected Roadtype) 
  Fatality Rate  13.0%  0.311 
  Speed  4.7%  0.045 
Urban Interstates (Unaffected Roadtype) 
  Fatality Rate  -5.9%  -0.063 
  Speed  -0.9%  -0.009 
Rural Arterials (Unaffected Roadtype) 
  Fatality Rate  -3.2%  0.005 
  Speed  0.9%  0.008 
See Notes to Tables 1 and 2A.  The entries in this table represent two different 
difference in differences estimates of the effects of the 65 mph speed limit on fatality 
rates and speeds.  The column (1) entries are the raw DD estimates from Table 2A, 
normalized by the pre-period level in adopting states.  The column (2) entries are 
calculated with the mean of ln (fatality rate) and ln (speed) for adopters and non-
adopters in the pre and post periods.  The entries are equal to the post - pre difference of 
weighted means among adopters minus the post - pre difference of weighted means 
among non-adopters, where the weight is vehicle miles of travel. 
 
 
 Table 3: Proportionate (Log) Effect of the Adoption of the 65 mph Speed 
Limit on Fatalities Controlling for the Observed Mileage, by Roadtype 
 Affected  Roadtype Unaffected Roadtypes 
 Rural  Interstates Urban  Interstates Rural Arterials 
Sample (1)  (2)  (3) 
Annual Effects      
1982-6, 1987  -0.098  -0.203  -0.062 
 (.195)  (.174)  (.119) 
1982-6, 1988  0.351*  -0.223*  -0.073 
 (.165)  (.111)  (.050) 
1982-6, 1989  0.473  -0.062  0.021 
 (.259)  (.142)  (.071) 
1982-6, 1990  0.268  0.073  0.181* 
 (.163)  (.161)  (.090) 
1982-6, 1991  0.202  -0.097  0.238** 
 (.123)  (.135)  (.073) 
1982-6, 1992  0.399**  -0.012  0.140* 
 (.162)  (.190)  (.087) 
1982-6, 1993  0.493**  -0.059  0.113 
 (.179)  (.154)  (.077) 
Average Effect      
1982-1993 0.360**  -0.056 0.082* 
 (.091)  (.073)  (.040) 
Notes: The entries are estimated regression coefficients from an indicator 
for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force in the state by year in 
models for the dependent variable of the natural logarithim of the number 
of fatalities.  These models include the ln of vehicle-miles of travel and 
state-roadtype and year-roadtype fixed effects.  The sample includes the 
28 states (21 adopted) with rural interstates and for whom speed data are 
available.  The years included in the sample are noted in the row headings.  
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * 
indicates significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level. Table 4: Proportionate (Log) Effect of the Adoption of the 65 mph Speed 
Limit on Hour Required to Travel the Observed Mileage, by Roadtype 
 Affected  Roadtype Unaffected Roadtypes 
 Rural  Interstates Urban  Interstates Rural Arterials 
Sample (1)  (2)  (3) 
Annual Effects      
1982-6, 1987  -0.039*  -0.014  -0.047 
 (.018)  (.018)  (.025) 
1982-6, 1988  -0.041**  -0.002  -0.006 
 (.009)  (.011)  (.007) 
1982-6, 1989  -0.038*  0.004  0.007 
 (.018)  (.014)  (.013) 
1982-6, 1990  -0.025  -0.011  0.002 
 (.017)  (.016)  (.013) 
1982-6, 1991  -0.043**  -0.012  0.005 
 (.017)  (.015)  (.010) 
1982-6, 1992  -0.057**  -0.021  0.003 
 (.017)  (.019)  (.014) 
1982-6, 1993  -0.054**  -0.024  0.002 
 (.015)  (.014)  (.016) 
Average Effect      
1982-1993 -0.041**  -0.009 -0.000 
 (.007)  (.007)  (.007) 
Notes: The entries are estimated regression coefficients from an 
indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force in the state by 
year in models for the dependent variable of hours required to drive the 
observed mileage.  These models include the ln of vehicle-miles of 
travel and state-roadtype and year-roadtype fixed effects.  The sample 
includes the 28 states (21 adopted) with rural interstates and for whom 
speed data are available.  The years included in the sample are noted in 
the row headings.  Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  * indicates significance at 5% level; ** 
indicates significance at 1% level. Table 5: Testing the Robustness of the Effect of the 65 Mph Speed Limit 
on Fatalities and Travel Times 
Sample  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable: Ln (Fatalities)    
Rural Interstates  --------- 0.360** --------- 
Only   (.091)  
Rural  Interstates  &  0.312** 0.417** 0.414** 
Urban  Interstates  (.097) (.117) (.130) 
Rural  Interstates  &  0.244** 0.278** 0.269** 
Rural  Arterials  (.070) (.099) (.098) 
All  Three  0.280** 0.349** 0.337** 
Roadtypes  (.073) (.101) (.096) 
Dep. Variable: Ln (Hours of Travel)    
Rural Interstates  --------- -0.041** --------- 
Only   (.007)  
Rural  Interstates  &  -0.030** -0.032** -0.031** 
Urban  Interstates  (.007) (.010) (.007) 
Rural  Interstates  &  -0.041** -0.040** -0.033** 
Rural  Arterials  (.006) (.010) (.008) 
All  Three  -0.036** -0.036** -0.033** 
  (.006) (.009) (.006) 
Ln (vmt) x Roadtype  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Indicators  Yes  No  No 
Year-Roadtype Indicators  No  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year Indicators  No  No  Yes 
Notes: The two panels present results from regressions where the 
dependent variables are the ln of fatalities and ln of hours driving, 
respectively.  The entries are the estimated regression coefficients for an 
indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from rural interstates when 
the 65 mph speed limit is in force.  Road types are pooled for the 
analysis in different ways, as shown by the row labels.  The bottom of 
the table lists the controls in each of the specifications.  Heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * indicates 
significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level.Table 6A: Estimates of the Monetary Value of the Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
Sample (1)  (2)  (3) 
Functional Form I: Ln Transformation    
Rural Interstates  --------- -0.113** --------- 
Only   (.037)   
   [$1.64  million]  
Rural Interstates &  -0.095*  -0.076*  -0.076** 
Urban Interstates  (.040)  (.034)  (.031) 
  [$1.38 million] [$1.11 million] [$1.11 million] 
Rural Interstates &  -0.166**  -0.146*  -0.122* 
Rural Arterials  (.057)  (.066)  (.051) 
  [$2.42 million] [$2.12 million] [$1.78 million] 
All Three  -0.128**  -0.103**  -0.099** 
 (.042)  (.041)  (.034) 
  [$1.86 million] [$1.50 million] [$1.44 million] 
      
Year Indicators  Yes  No  No 
Year-Roadtype Indicators  No  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year Indicators  No  No  No 
Notes: See Notes to Table 5.  The entries report the results from regressions of 
ln (Hours of Travel) on ln (Fatalities), where an indicator for whether the 65 
mph speed limit was in force is an instrumental variable for ln (Fatalities).  Ln 
(vmt) is a control and its effect is allowed to vary by roadtype.  The entries are 
the parameter estimates and heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) on ln (Fatalities) and the implied monetary value of the time saved 
per marginal fatality, V, [in square brackets].  * indicates significance at 5% 
level; ** indicates significance at 1% level. Table 6B: Estimates of the Monetary Value of the Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
Sample  (1) (2) (3) 
Functional Form II: Untransformed   
Rural Interstates  --------- 17.03* --------- 
Only   (7.67)  
   [$5.92  million]  
Rural Interstates &  25.64**  16.39*  8.65* 
Urban  Interstates  (9.42) (7.46) (3.84) 
  [$8.91 million] [$5.69 million] [$3.00 million] 
Rural Interstates &  4.01**  8.25  7.88* 
Rural  Arterials  (0.51) (4.32) (3.79) 
  [$1.39 million] [$2.87 million] [$2.74 million] 
All  Three  6.97** 11.98* 8.80** 
  (1.16) (5.06) (3.57) 
  [$2.42 million] [$4.16 million] [$3.06 million] 
     
Year Indicators  Yes  No  No 
Year-Roadtype Indicators  No  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year  Indicators  No No No 
Notes: See Notes to Table 5.  The entries report the results from regressions of 
speed on the fatality rate, where an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit 
was in force is an instrumental variable for the fatality rate.  The equation is 
weighted by vmt.  The entries are the parameter estimates and heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors (in parentheses) on the fatality rate and the implied 
monetary value of the time saved per marginal fatality, V, [in square brackets].  
* indicates significance at 5% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level.   
 Table 7: State-by-State Estimates of Monetary Value of Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
 "Fatality  Effect" "Speed  Effect" IV  Elasticity Estimated  Value  of 
 Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard Parameter Standard  Time  Saved 
  Estimate Error  Estimate  Error Estimate Error  per  Fatality 
            Millions  of  1997$ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Arizona 0.229  (.178)  -0.054**  (.017)  -0.239  (.215)  $1.92 
Arkansas 0.348  (.250)  0.033**  (.010)  0.094  (.072)  -$1.12 
California 0.139  (.123)  -0.060**  (.012)  -0.431  (.403)  $4.75 
Colorado 0.396*  (.179)  -0.084**  (.013)  -0.212*  (.089)  $2.31 
Idaho 0.335  (.279)  -0.081**  (.011)  -0.241  (.201)  $2.05 
Illinois 0.310*  (.155)  -0.040**  (.008)  -0.128  (.076)  $3.19 
Indiana  -0.039 (.271) 0.002 (.012)  0.045  (.497)  -$0.70 
Iowa 0.505**  (.184)  -0.053**  (.015)  -0.106*  (.053)  $2.97 
Kansas 0.377  (.234)  -0.042**  (.014)  -0.113  (.077)  $1.96 
Kentucky 0.461*  (.214)  -0.033  (.019)  -0.071  (.049)  $1.24 
Michigan 0.591**  (.221)  -0.019  (.015)  -0.033  (.029) $0.99 
Mississippi 0.193  (.205)  -0.015  (.017)  -0.079  (.120) $0.76 
Nevada 0.261  (.253)  -0.022  (.017)  -0.082  (.098)  $0.49 
North Carolina  0.612*  (.290)  -0.037**  (.012)  -0.061  (.035)  $1.09 
Ohio  0.553* (.232) 0.007 (.015)  0.013  (.027)  -$0.47 
Oregon 0.141  (.220)  -0.048**  (.013)  -0.340  (.536)  $5.41 
South Carolina  0.405  (.247)  -0.040**  (.014)  -0.099  (.077)  $1.68 
South Dakota  0.656*  (.274)  -0.072**  (.013)  -0.110*  (.049)  $1.92 
Tennessee 0.316*  (.147)  -0.006  (.013)  -0.020  (.043) $0.29 
Wisconsin 0.118  (.227)  -0.039**  (.014)  -0.330  (.609) $9.71 
Wyoming 0.301  (.315)  -0.017  (.016)  -0.055  (.088)  $0.50 
Notes: See Notes to Tables 5 and 6A and 6B.  The entries in columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6) are from fitting 
equations (12a), (12b), and (11), respectively.  The sample for each of these regressions includes observations on 
rural interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit and the state for 
which the estimate applies.  The controls include the logarithm of vmt interacted with roadtype and state-roadtype, 
roadtype-year, and state-year fixed effects.  Five states (Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, and Wyoming) had 
missing speed data for 1 to 3 years during the period when the 65 mph speed limit was in force.  In the estimation of 
the state-specific parameters for these states, the observations from the states that retained the 55 mph limit were 
dropped in those years.  The state-specific IV estimated values of time saved per marginal fatality are calculated by 
multiplying the IV elasticity (column (5)) by the state-specific ratio of hours traveled to total fatalities and the state-
specific mean hourly wage.  Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * indicates 
significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level.     
Table 8: Recovering the Value of a Statistical Life, V* 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit Estimates for Probability of Adoption    
Constant  8.24** 8.24** 8.24** 8.24** 
  (2.87) (2.87) (2.87) (2.87) 
Traffic Density in 1986  -32.21** -32.21** -32.21**  -32.21**
  (8.00) (8.00) (8.00) (8.00) 
Mean Wage in 1986  -0.56  -0.56  -0.56  -0.56 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Estimates from Value of Time Saved per Fatality (i.e., V) Equation  
Constant 2.56**  2.46**  2.77**  2.39* 
  (0.76) (0.90) (0.98) (1.12) 
Traffic Density in 1986  -24.52  -23.39  -35.74  -34.94 
  (20.87) (20.21) (28.07) (26.40) 
Inverse of Mill's Ratio  3.60  -0.12  5.42  4.74 
  (2.07) (2.21) (5.29) (2.49) 
Value of a Statistical Life         
V* (millions of 1997$s)  $1.54  $1.49  $1.29  $0.94 
 [$1.95]  [$1.18]  [$1.68] [$1.48] 
Huber-White Std. Errors in V Equation  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in V Equation  No  No  Yes  No 
Weight V Eq. by Inverse of Elasticity's Std Err No  Yes  No  No 
Median Regression  No  No  Yes  No 
Robust Regression  No  No  No  Yes 
Notes: The first panel presents estimates and Huber-White standard errors (in parentheses) from 
the probit equation for the probability that a state adopted the 65 mph speed limit, which is 
equation (9) in the text.  This equation is estimated on the 47 states with rural interstates.  The 
second panel presents estimates from the fitting of the V equation, which is equation (6) in the 
text.  The inverse of the Mill's ratio is calculated with the results from the probit equation.  These 
equations are estimated in two-steps, because we do not have V data for 19 of the 40 adopting 
states but we want to use data from those states in estimating the probit.  The row labels at the 
bottom of the table provide estimation details on the second step.  The third panel presents the 
estimated value of a statistical life, V*.  It is calculated with the parameters from the first two 
panels as described in Section I of the text.  In square brackets below the estimated V*, we list 
the parameter estimate from the constant in a regression of the V's on a constant.  The estimation 
details in the row labels apply to this simple regression as well.  * indicates significance at 5% 
level; ** indicates significance at 1% level. Table 9: Adjustments to the Estimates of V and V* 
   
   
Adjust the Value of a Hour for 
Nonwage Compensation in 1986 
       




1.00 1.22 Adjust Hours Saved for the 
Average Number of Car Occupants 
in 1986  Yes 
 
1.70    2.07
 
Notes: The estimated number of occupants per vehicle in 1986 is obtained by taking the mean 
of this variable from the 1983 and 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Surveys.  These 
surveys are not representative at the state level, so we cannot calculate state-specific estimates 
of hours saved that account for the number of occupants per vehicle.  The best estimate of 
nonwage compensation comes from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the 
United States.  Total compensation to employees was $2.571 (in billions) in 1986.  "Wage and 
Salary Accruals" accounted for $2.114 and "Supplements to Wages and Salaries" comprised 
the remaining $0.456.  The Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group measure of 
wages is similar to the NIPA "Wage and Salary Accruals" category, so we estimate that 











































Fatality Rate per 100 Million VMT
In 1974 the Federal 
Government Imposed a 
National  Maximum Speed 
Limit of 55 Mph.  Previously 
In 1987, the Federal Government 
Allowed States to Raise the Speed Limit 
to 65 Mph on Rural Interstates Only.  
Forty States Exercised this Option.Figure 2: Adoption Status and Speed Data Availability, by State 
Retained 55 Mph Limit   (7)
Adopted 65 Mph Limit (Data Available)   (21)
Adopted 65 Mph Limit (Data Unavailable)   (19)







































Adopted 65 Mph Speed Limit Retained 55 Mph Speed Limit
In 1987 States were 
Allowed to Adopt the 
65 Mph Speed Limit 
on Rural Interstates
Notes: The fatality rate is calculated as the weighted mean of the number of fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles of travel, where 
the weight is vehicle miles of travel.  
 
  








































Adopted 65 Mph Speed Limit Retained 55 Mph Speed Limit
In 1987 States were 
Allowed to Adopt the 
65 Mph Speed Limit 
on Rural Interstates
Notes: Mean speed is calculated as the weighted mean, where the weight is vehicle miles of travel.
 
 